We use household and village survey data from South India to examine who participates in village meetings called by elected local governments, and what e¤ect these meetings have on bene…ciary selection for welfare programs. Our main …nding is that members of socially and economically disadvantaged groups, speci…cally landless and low caste individuals, are both more likely to attend these meetings and be chosen as bene…ciaries in villages which have village meetings.
Introduction
How to structure democratic institutions to ensure a fair and e¢ cient allocation of public funds is a central issue in the political economy of development.
The new governance agenda has emphasized citizen empowerment as a tool for improving the workings of democratic institutions. 1 But such terms can easily be dismissed as empty rhetoric unless embodied in workable institutional solutions.
The idea that encouraging citizen participation can improve the workings of a democracy is also echoed in the political science literature. One role for participation emphasized in that literature is to improve the ‡ow of information into the political process beyond that available by electing representatives. Thus, Verba et (1995) characterize political participation as "information rich"acts and observe that:
"From the electoral outcome alone, the winning candidate cannot discriminate which of dozens of factors, from the position taken on a particular issue to the inept campaign run by the opposition ..., was responsible for the electoral victory." (page 10).
This paper studies an institution to encourage political participation among the poor and to improve the quality of governance in an Indian context -Gram Sabha meetings. These are village meetings called by the elected local government (Gram Panchayat) to discuss resource allocation decisions in the village. 2 There are two main ways in which such meetings may improve the workings of government. First, relative to elected representatives, 1 See, for example, World Bank (2000). 2 The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of India in 1993 made it mandatory for these meetings may better re ‡ect citizens'preferences on issues such as how to target resources to the neediest groups. Second, by providing a forum for monitoring the actions of elected representatives they may reduce agency problems in politics, and the extent of corruption.
While holding Gram Sabhas is compulsory, their frequency and content owes a lot to the discretion of elected o¢ cials. 3 Moreover, even a wellattended meeting may have no bite on policy decisions. Here, we exploit a large household and village survey of local governments in the four South Indian states to examine the determinants of participation in Gram Sabhas, and whether having a Gram Sabha a¤ects bene…ciary selection for welfare programs.
While there is much interest in how participation improves the quality of governance in the developing world (see, for example, Manor (2004)), evidence on the determinants of participation at the household level is thin, especially compared to the extensive studies available for the advanced democracies. Moreover, the literature is replete with concerns about elite dominance of democratic institutions. 4 This raises the specter of participatory institutions being a veil which have little impact on the well-being of the poor.
Here, however, we …nd that it is the most disadvantaged groups who attend village meetings and that holding such meetings improves the targeting of resources towards the neediest groups. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the context for our study and our data. Section three contains the analysis, and Section four concludes.
Context
Our focus is on the lowest level of self government in India, the Gram Panchayat (GP). Each GP covers between 1-5 villages. The Gram Sabha is a village-level body consisting of persons registered in the electoral rolls of a GP. It was intended to be a supervisory body that audits and regulates the functioning of the GP. Speci…cally, it is supposed to ratify the GP budget, and identify and approve of bene…ciaries for welfare schemes implemented by the GP. To achieve these tasks, most Indian states require that the Gram Sabha meet (roughly) four times a year.
Between we selected 3 pairs of blocks (that is, 3 blocks in each of the two districts). We chose the three most 'linguistically similar'block pairs. We de…ned linguistic similarity in terms of the mother tongue of individuals living in the block, and computed it using 1991 census block level language data. The historical and administrative similarity of linguistically matched blocks was checked using princely state maps and the Report of the States Reorganization Committee (for details on sampling procedure, see Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao, 2004b). In total, we had 18 block pairs. In each block we randomly sampled 3 GPs, and per GP up to 3 villages. In Kerala, we sampled wards rather than villages as ward size approximates village size in other states.
In every village, we conducted group meetings in which we obtained information on the last Gram Sabha meeting, and also village-level demographic and economic variables. In a random sub-sample of 259 villages we conducted twenty household surveys, and obtained information on Gram Sabha attendance and household bene…ciary status. In our household data-set we observe that while over 50 percent of the respondents had heard of a Gram Sabha only 20 percent had ever attended a Gram Sabha meeting. We also collected information on a household's bene…ciary status, as de…ned by whether it has a 'Below Poverty Line' (BPL)
card. The GP, in collaboration with state government o¢ cials, is supposed to identify (via a census) households with income below the poverty line, and to
give these households a BPL card. Possession of this card makes the household eligible for an array of government schemes, ranging from subsidized food through the public distribution system to free hospitalization. The list of BPL households, and subsequent selection of bene…ciary households under various schemes is supposed to be rati…ed in Gram Sabha meetings.
Analysis
The analysis is in two parts. We …rst study the determinants of holding a Gram Sabha meeting and who attends. We then look for evidence that holding a Gram Sabha meeting a¤ects public resources allocation.
Determinants of holding a Gram Sabha and who attends
To study which villages have Gram Sabha meetings we estimate a linear probability regression of the following form: The results are in Table 2 , column (1). More populous villages are more likely to have had a Gram Sabha meeting, and there is weak evidence that villages with a higher literacy rate are more likely to hold Gram Sabha meetings. Interestingly, after conditioning on matched block pair e¤ects we don't observe any signi…cant state di¤erences in the decision to have a Gram Sabha.
In Columns (2)- (5) we use our household data to examine who has heard of, and who attends Gram Sabha meetings. Columns (2) and (3) literacy rates and measures of individual economic and social disadvantage.
Illiterate, landless and SC/ST individuals, but not women, are more likely to participate in higher literacy villages.
These …ndings are notable for two reasons. First, there is some suggestion of a political externality from living in a more literate community.
Second, Gram Sabha meetings seem to a be a forum used by some of the most disadvantaged groups in the village -landless, illiterates and scheduled castes/tribes. This suggests that these groups …nd the Gram Sabha useful and that Gram Sabha meetings may play some role in moving policy in a direction favored by these groups. We now look for evidence of the latter.
Does participation matter?
There are many who argue that participation in the political process has an intrinsic bene…t. It builds trust in government and legitimizes state action.
Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to look at these issues. However, we are able to look at the possibility that participation in Gram Sabhas yields instrumental (i.e. policy) bene…ts. These could be community wide or by targeting resources to more speci…c groups. Here, we will focus on the latter, examining whether targeting of public programs are related to whether a Gram Sabha meeting has been held in the past twelve months.
We focus on an important speci…c policy administered at the village level -access to a below poverty line (BPL) card. Bene…ciary selection for such cards is in ‡uenced by the GP. As discussed earlier, possession of this card gives a villager access to an array of public bene…ts. We estimate a household regression which exploits within village variation in individual characteristics to examine whether the targeting of BPL cards di¤ers depending on whether the village had a Gram Sabha in the last year. Our key equation is: The results are reported in Table 3 . In column (1) These results do show persuasively that there is heterogeneity in targeting BPL cards across villages. Moreover, it would be tempting to attribute this to whether a Gram Sabha meeting is held. However, some caution is warranted. In column (3), we interact the characteristics that represent dis-advantage -illiteracy, landlessness and schedule caste/tribe -with the village literacy rate instead of whether the village had a Gram Sabha meeting. All three of these interactions are signi…cant. However, the point estimate of the e¤ect evaluated at the mean literacy rate is substantially smaller than the e¤ects in columns (2)- (4). But this does raise the possibility that holding a
Gram Sabha meeting is correlated with other village characteristics that are important in shaping the way in which public resources are targeted. Unfortunately, this is not an issue that we can resolve. However, these encouraging results on Gram Sabhas clearly deserve further careful investigation.
Concluding Comments
While this paper focusses on a speci…c institution -the Gram Sabha -the results contribute to a wider debate on how institution design can shape public resource allocation and how the poor can increase their voice in public institutions. It is frequently remarked that poverty is much more than material deprivation and that the poor may receive much less voice in the political process. Moreover, a good deal of cynicism attends initiatives to strengthen that voice.
In this regard, our results sound a more optimistic note. Robust standard errors, clustered by village, in brackets. All regressions include respondent age and age squared as controls. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
